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“‘MALE CHAUVINISM’ IS UNDER ATTACK FROM 
ALL SIDES AT PRESENT”:  ROBERTS V. UNITED 
STATES JAYCEES, SEX DISCRIMINATION, 
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Linda C. McClain* 
INTRODUCTION 
The connection between gender equality and the First Amendment brings 
to mind potent imagery about twentieth-century constitutional interpretation.  
In the late 1980s, then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg explained that, well into 
the twentieth century, “except for the franchise[,] . . . the Constitution 
remained an empty cupboard for people seeking to promote the equal status 
and stature of men and women under the law.”1  Ginsburg observed that the 
Warren Court, in 1960s cases such as Hoyt v. Florida,2 “held the baseline set 
by the Supreme Court in the 1870s”3 in Bradwell v. Illinois.4  Bradwell 
includes Justice Joseph P. Bradley’s infamous concurring opinion where he 
appealed to “divine ordinance” and “the nature of things” to explain man’s 
role as “woman’s protector and defender” and woman’s “destiny and 
mission . . . [to be] wife and mother” rather than hold “occupations of civil 
life,” such as the practice of law.5  Upholding a Florida law that granted only 
women an absolute exemption from jury service, Hoyt noted “the enlightened 
emancipation of women from the restrictions and protections of bygone 
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 1. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Women Becoming Part of the Constitution, 6 LAW 
& INEQUALITY 17, 18 (1988). 
 2. 368 U.S. 57 (1961). 
 3. Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 19. 
 4. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873). 
 5. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). 
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years” but asserted that “woman is still regarded as the center of home and 
family life.”6 
The Court’s approach to the Equal Protection Clause began to change in 
1971 when the “conservative” Burger Court took the “modestly 
revolutionary” step of critically examining and striking down gender-based 
classifications.7  As a pioneering litigator, Ginsburg played a key role in the 
familiar story of this new, generative power of the Equal Protection Clause:  
her efforts led to the Court’s adoption of the intermediate scrutiny test to 
dismantle discriminatory laws based on archaic and overbroad stereotypes 
about the “relative needs and capacities of the sexes.”8 
Does an “empty cupboard” aptly capture the First Amendment as a 
resource for advancing “the equal status and stature of men and women under 
the law”?9  Or does a more troubling picture apply:  that, as historically 
interpreted, the First Amendment has been a roadblock to gender equality?  
Certainly, some have lodged this critique of First Amendment jurisprudence 
concerning freedom of speech.  Ninety years ago, Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr., in dissent, asserted the imperative of “attachment” to the 
constitutional principle of “free thought—not . . . for those who agree with 
us, but freedom for the thought that we hate,” which subsequently became a 
frequent justification for protecting hateful speech.10  In 2017, after 
observing that “speech that demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, 
religion, age, disability, or any other similar ground is hateful,” Justice Alito 
quoted Justice Holmes:  “The proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence 
is that we protect the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.’”11 
Over thirty years ago, in American Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut,12 Judge 
Frank Easterbrook similarly appealed to the First Amendment’s distinctive 
protection of an absolute right to “propagate” even hateful opinions, as he 
struck down an Indianapolis anti-pornography civil rights ordinance drafted 
by Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin.13  In words that still startle 
for their almost perverse delight in conceding the costs of First Amendment 
absolutism and protecting hateful speech, Judge Easterbrook accepted the 
legislation’s premise—that “depictions of subordination [of women] tend to 
perpetuate subordination,” which leads to many negative consequences in 
 
 6. Hoyt, 368 U.S. at 61–62. 
 7. Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 18–19. 
 8. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197–98 (1976); see also Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 
U.S. 609, 625 (1984) (describing the Court’s historical application of the Equal Protection 
Clause); Wendy W. Williams, Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Equal Protection Clause:  1970–80, 25 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 41, 41–43 (2013).  This “gender revolution” in constitutional law 
impacts the story told in this Article, but is not its primary focus. 
 9. Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 18. 
 10. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654–55 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 11. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764 (2017) (quoting Schwimmer, 279 U.S. at 655 
(Holmes, J., dissenting)).  The Court held unconstitutional the Patent and Trademark Office’s 
refusal to register “The Slants” as a band’s trademark, finding that the term might be seen as 
demeaning to Asian Americans. Id.  The band’s evident aim was to “reclaim” the slur and help 
“drain its denigrating force.” Id. at 1751. 
 12. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 13. Id. at 328. 
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women’s daily lives in the home, at work, and “on the streets.”14  But, he 
insisted, “this simply demonstrates the power of pornography as speech.”15  
Such speech is protected, just as are “racial bigotry, anti-semitism, violence 
on television, [and] reporter’s biases,” which influence society and generally 
can only be rebutted by other speech in “the popular culture.”16  Any other 
approach would make government the “great censor and director of which 
thoughts are good for us.”17  To be sure, some feminists who opposed the 
ordinance warned of governmental censorship and asserted that women’s 
freedom and equality require robust protection of speech.18  Today, feminist 
legal scholars and activists attempt to navigate regulation of hateful online 
speech and activity without running into the roadblock of hallowed First 
Amendment protection for “the thought that we hate.”19 
Still yet, consider the First Amendment as “the proverbial double-edged 
sword.”20  Privacy scholar Anita Allen finds that First Amendment privacy 
doctrines concerning associational privacy (or freedom of association) and 
“privacies of religion, thought, and intellect”21 have been used both to 
advocate for “progressively liberal social change”22 and to preserve “social 
stasis” and oppose government “interfer[ence] with traditional practices 
merely for the sake of progressive ideas about marriage, family, social life, 
or citizenship.”23  Whether used by progressive liberals or social 
conservatives, First Amendment privacy doctrines prove “an attractive but 
perilous weapon.”24 
This Article considers the relationship between gender equality and 
freedom of association.  Freedom of association has a complex relationship 
to the important goals of furthering gender equality and nondiscrimination.  
As I have argued elsewhere, freedom of association—freedom to join and 
 
 14. Id. at 328–29. 
 15. Id. at 329. 
 16. Id. at 330. 
 17. Id.  Challenging these premises falls outside the scope of this Article, but, arguably, 
recent neuroscience studies demonstrating a link between hateful and dehumanizing speech 
about out-groups and prejudice and lack of empathy might warrant reconsideration of this 
“absolute right,” particularly as exercised on the internet and in politics. See Richard A. 
Friedman, The Neuroscience of Hate Speech, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/31/opinion/caravan-hate-speech-bowers-sayoc.html 
[http://perma.cc/8FUL-ZFTK]. 
 18. Brief Amici Curiae of Feminist Anti-Censorship Taskforce, et al., American 
Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985) (No. 84-3147), reprinted in SEX, 
MORALITY, AND THE LAW 199, 210–11 (Lori Gruen & George E. Panichas eds., 1997) 
(recognizing that “freedom and socially recognized space” for the “range of feminist 
imagination and expression in the realm of sexuality [that] has begun to find voice” would be 
at risk from laws like the ordinance, which constrict freedom of speech). 
 19. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654–55 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
See generally DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014). 
 20. Anita L. Allen, First Amendment Privacy and the Battle for Progressively Liberal 
Social Change, 14 J. CONST. L. 885, 887 (2012). 
 21. Id. at 886. 
 22. Id. at 900. 
 23. Id. at 886.  Allen focuses on First Amendment privacy doctrines, including 
“associational privacy” and “privacies of religion, thought, and intellect.” Id. 
 24. Id. 
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participate in the myriad groups of civil society—“contributes to liberal 
democracy by affording oppositional space to ‘enclaves of protected 
discourse and action,’ which allows social actors to seek to correct injustices 
by bringing about change.”25  Freedom of association protects spaces in civil 
society in which members of groups may challenge an unjust status quo and 
also find mutual support.  For example, historical and modern women’s 
organizations played and continue to play an important role in the gender 
equality movement.26 
Although not explicitly mentioned in the First Amendment, freedom of 
association underlies and facilitates enumerated First Amendment rights:  
freedom of speech, the free exercise of religion, and freedom of assembly.27  
Freedom of association has a complex relationship with securing free and 
equal citizenship and, particularly, gender equality.  It is indeed double-
edged, as illustrated by Roberts v. United States Jaycees.28  In Jaycees, even 
as the Court elaborated upon the values advanced by the freedom of 
association, it upheld the application of Minnesota’s public accommodations 
law to the U.S. Jaycees’s exclusion of women from regular membership 
despite the Jaycees’s freedom of speech and association claims.29  In doing 
so, it affirmed the state’s compelling interest in preventing the distinct harms 
of invidious discrimination in “the distribution of publicly available goods, 
services, and other advantages.”30  Both aspects of Jaycees live on:  in party 
briefs and judicial rulings, it is a frequent reference for the First 
Amendment’s protection of freedom of association and for the state’s 
compelling interest in prohibiting invidious discrimination, even in the face 
of First Amendment claims.31  Jaycees has been criticized by both 
conservative and liberal political and legal theorists, who argue that the Court 
insufficiently protected the Jaycees’s associational rights at the expense of 
 
 25. JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY:  RIGHTS, 
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES 111 (2013) (quoting Jane Mansbridge, Using Power/Fighting 
Power:  The Polity, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE:  CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE 
POLITICAL 46, 58 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996)). 
 26. See, e.g., PAULA GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER:  THE IMPACT OF BLACK 
WOMEN ON RACE AND SEX IN AMERICA 94–117 (1984) (describing efforts of the Black 
women’s club movement, the National Association of Club Women); Claudia Center, “Boys 
Keep Out!”:  Historical and Legal Perspectives on the Contributions of All-Female 
Organizations to Sex Equality, 8 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 1–3 (1992) (discussing the nineteenth-
century women’s club movement and twentieth-century efforts). 
 27. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1957). 
 28. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
 29. Id. at 622–23. 
 30. Id. at 628. 
 31. Curiously, however, legal scholars have comparatively neglected Jaycees, as 
measured by the cases that find their way into the various collections of “law stories” or 
“rewritten opinions” projects.  It is not included in any of West’s “Law Stories,” including 
those for which it seems a good candidate (for example, the volumes on civil rights, 
constitutional law, First Amendment, and women and the law).  Similarly, Cambridge 
University Press’s “Feminist Judgments” series of rewritten U.S. Supreme Court opinions has 
not included it so far. 
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constitutional democracy and pluralism and overestimated the impact of the 
Jaycees’s membership policies on women’s equal citizenship.32 
Many take it for granted that, today, discriminating against women as 
women in the marketplace is illegal and morally wrong.  Studying the Jaycees 
litigation over the reach of public accommodations law reveals parties 
wrestling over that reach and over the force of the race-sex analogy.  One 
striking contrast is the different ways that the parties and their amici invoked 
NAACP v. Alabama33 and compared or contrasted the NAACP and the 
Jaycees. 
Part I begins with the Supreme Court’s recognition of the freedom of 
association as first articulated in NAACP v. Alabama.  It shows how, in the 
context of race discrimination, some key civil rights victories have enlisted 
claims of the freedom of association, while some other victories have 
prevailed against such claims.  Those precedents set the foundation for the 
Court’s decision in Jaycees, which concerned gender discrimination.  Part II 
focuses on the role of Jaycees in drawing an analogy between the harms of 
gender discrimination and sexual-orientation discrimination and on the limits 
of freedom of association claims in both contexts.  It highlights how parties 
and amici in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission34 relied on Jaycees to connect race and sex discrimination to 
sexual-orientation discrimination.  In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the 
petitioner—a baker who refused to create a wedding cake for a same-sex 
couple—argued that the application of Colorado’s public accommodations 
law to him violated his right to free exercise of religion and impermissibly 
compelled his creative expression.35  I focus in particular on the arguments 
made by the National Women’s Law Center, an amicus in support of the 
respondents.  Part III returns to Jaycees and examines the arguments made 
by the parties and their amici regarding the evident conflict between 
promoting sex equality—women’s full participation in society—and 
protecting freedom of association.  What was at stake for women in being 
excluded from full membership in organizations, like the Jaycees and all-
male private clubs, that provided members “an entree to the ‘Old Boys 
Network’”?36  What was at stake for the Jaycees and similar organizations in 
a climate in which (as one amicus put it) “‘Male chauvinism’ is under attack 
from all sides”?37 
 
 32. See, e.g., John D. Inazu, The Unsettling “Well-Settled” Law of Freedom of 
Association, 43 CONN. L. REV. 149 (2010); George Kateb, The Value of Association, in 
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 35, 60–61 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998). See generally Nancy 
Rosenblum, Compelled Association, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, supra, at 75. 
 33. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
 34. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
 35. Id. at 1726. 
 36. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Organization for Women et al. in Support of 
Reversal, Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (No. 83-724), 1984 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs 
LEXIS 226, at *19 [hereinafter Brief Amicus Curiae of NOW]. 
 37. Amicus Curiae Brief of Rotary International, Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 
(1984) (No. 83-724), 1984 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 236, at *36. 
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Part IV briefly returns to the present day and asks whether the old boys 
network that presented such a vexing barrier to women’s economic and 
career mobility is simply a relic of the past or has continuing potency.  Part 
IV concludes by comparing some present-day controversies over freedom of 
association and gender equality to those fought out in Jaycees. 
I.  FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION VERSUS FREEDOM FROM DISCRIMINATION:  
NAACP V. ALABAMA AND JAYCEES 
The U.S. Supreme Court first recognized the freedom of association in 
NAACP v. Alabama, which powerfully exemplifies the importance of 
protecting space for challenging the status quo.  In the late 1950s, the 
NAACP successfully challenged an Alabama law that would have required 
disclosure of its rank-and-file membership list.38  Doing so would have 
exposed its members to “economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of 
physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility.”39  Protecting 
the group’s membership list meant that African American members could 
create community, organize, and strategize without fear of reprisal simply for 
belonging to the NAACP.40 
On the other hand, some key civil rights victories have involved prevailing 
against freedom of association claims.  Two famous examples in the context 
of race discrimination are Norwood v. Harrison41 and Runyon v. McCrary.42  
In Norwood, the Court held that Mississippi could not provide textbooks to 
“virtually all white” private schools that racially discriminated. In often-
quoted language, it stated:  “Although the Constitution does not proscribe 
private bias, it places no value on discrimination . . . .  Invidious private 
discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of 
association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded 
affirmative constitutional protection.”43  In Runyon, the Court held that 
applying 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which prohibits racial discrimination in 
contracts, to white-only private schools did not violate parents’ or children’s 
freedom of association.44  Echoing Norwood, the Court explained that 
NAACP v. Alabama’s principle that freedom of association protects 
“effective advocacy of [controversial] public and private points of view”45 
 
 38. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958). 
 39. Id. at 462. 
 40. See Allen, supra note 20, at 902 (describing NAACP v. Alabama as “an important 
precedent available to other African Americans stymied by threats, intimidation, and 
opportunistic applications of state law”).  To my knowledge, there is no precise counterpart to 
NAACP v. Alabama with respect to gender equality.  I have not been able to find a case in 
which the Court protected the associational freedom of an organization dedicated to advancing 
gender equality against a state law threatening it in some way. 
 41. 413 U.S. 455 (1973). 
 42. 427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
 43. Norwood, 413 U.S. at 457, 469–70. 
 44. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 168, 175–76. 
 45. Id. at 175 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)). 
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does not extend to “the practice of excluding racial minorities” from 
educational institutions.46 
In the context of gender equality, Jaycees is a key example of when 
freedom of association claims did not defeat governmental efforts to end 
discrimination.  The Court cited NAACP v. Alabama in elaborating the First 
Amendment’s protection of freedom of association for purposes of political 
expression but concluded that, although some of the Jaycees’s activities 
implicated this right, it was not an “absolute” right and could be infringed to 
“serve compelling state interests.”47  Citing Runyon, the Court stated that 
even if Minnesota’s law “incidental[ly] abridge[d]” the Jaycees’s protected 
speech, its discriminatory membership practices were not constitutionally 
protected.48 
The Court directly analogized the effects of sex-based discrimination to 
those of race-based discrimination.  The Court reaffirmed that the 
“fundamental object” of Title II of Civil Rights Act of 1964 “was to vindicate 
‘the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal 
access to public establishments.’”49  The Jaycees Court added:  “That 
stigmatizing injury, and the denial of equal opportunities that accompanies 
it, is surely felt as strongly by persons suffering discrimination on the basis 
of their sex as by those treated differently because of their race.”50 
Jaycees provided the analytical framework for the Court, later in the 
1980s, to uphold the application of state or municipal public 
accommodations laws prohibiting gender discrimination to large business-
oriented men’s associations, despite claims of freedom of association.51  
Decades later, it remains a staple in arguments that state antidiscrimination 
laws reflect the government’s compelling interest in ending invidious 
discrimination.  Conversely, some nongovernmental groups have 
successfully enlisted Jaycees to dispute that governmental interest or the 
proper reach of state public accommodations laws.52 
II.  THE PLACE OF JAYCEES IN THE MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP LITIGATION 
Jaycees reasons by analogizing different forms of discrimination.  Such 
arguments appeared in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights 
 
 46. Id. at 176; see Norwood, 413 U.S. at 470. 
 47. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623–24 (1984). 
 48. Id. at 628. 
 49. Id. at 625 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 
(1964)).  In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, the Court upheld Title II, the public 
accommodations provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, against a myriad of constitutional 
claims (although not a freedom of association one) brought by a motel operator. 379 U.S. 241, 
244, 258–62 (1964) (detailing and rejecting the motel operator’s Article I, Fifth Amendment, 
and Thirteenth Amendment claims). 
 50. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 625. 
 51. See N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1988); Bd. of 
Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 544 (1987) (“[Jaycees] provides 
the framework for analyzing the appellants’ constitutional claims.”). 
 52. See generally, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Hurley v. Irish-
Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
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Commission, in which petitioner Jack Phillips, the owner of Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, argued that compelling him to bake a wedding cake for a same-
sex couple, Charlie Craig and David Mullins, violated his free exercise of 
religion and compelled his creative expression.53 
In defending the application of Colorado’s public accommodations law 
against Phillips, the respondents—Craig, Mullins, and the Colorado Civil 
Rights Commission (CCRC)—and their amici enlisted Jaycees to argue that, 
just as the Court there compared the evils of race discrimination to those of 
sex discrimination, the Court here should compare the harms of race and sex 
discrimination to those of sexual-orientation discrimination.  As amici, the 
National Women’s Law Center (NWLC) and thirty-nine additional 
organizations made that argument but also discussed the importance of public 
accommodations law for fostering gender equality itself.54  The NWLC 
asserted that, if the Court accepted Phillips’s First Amendment arguments, it 
would undermine such laws both for women and for other protected groups.55  
The NWLC’s amicus brief provides a doorway for this Article’s 
consideration of the relationship between gender equality and the First 
Amendment and the tensions around the freedom of association. 
A.  From Race to Sex to Sexual Orientation:  The Government’s Interest  
in Ending Discrimination 
After the Supreme Court granted certiorari, nearly 100 amicus briefs 
offered various arguments concerning whether the application of the 
Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) to Phillips’s refusal to create a 
wedding cake for Craig and Mullins, on the basis of his sincere religious 
beliefs about marriage, violated his First Amendment rights to the free 
exercise of religion or freedom of speech.56  Hotly contested in the numerous 
briefs was whether there was an appropriate analogy between refusals of 
service based on a customer’s race and refusals based on a customer’s 
intended marriage partner.57  Was there, as respondents and their amici 
 
 53. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1726 
(2018). 
 54. Brief of the National Women’s Law Center and Other Groups as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondents at 1–6, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111) 
[hereinafter Brief Amici Curiae of the NWLC] (describing the thirty-nine organizations as 
“committed to obtaining economic security and equality for women”). 
 55. Id. at 16–22, 32–38. 
 56. See No. 16-111, SUP. CT. U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx? 
filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/16-111.html [https://perma.cc/6JAJ-YGJF] (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2019).  By my count, there were forty-five amicus briefs filed in support of 
petitioner, forty-six in support of respondents, and four in support of neither party—or ninety-
five in all. See id.  Phillips did not make a freedom of association argument. See generally 
Brief for Petitioners, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111). 
 57. Compare Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. in 
Support of Respondents at 2–3, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111) (drawing 
a direct parallel between the denial of service by Phillips to Craig, Mullins, and Mullins’s 
mother and the denial of service at a barbeque to three African American customers in 
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam)), with Brief of Amici 
Curiae Ethics & Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention et al. in 
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argued, a similar deprivation of dignity when the basis of discrimination was 
sexual orientation, and was the governmental interest as compelling?  Or, as 
an amicus for Phillips argued, were the concerns that motivated Title II 
simply “not present here”?58  In defending CADA, the respondents and their 
amici enlisted Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,59 along with 
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises.60  In Newman, the Court characterized 
as “patently frivolous” an objection by a white restaurant owner that Title II 
violated his free exercise of religion by compelling him to serve Black 
customers, contrary to his religious beliefs about segregation.61 
The race-discrimination analogy, however, was not the only one invoked 
to support CADA.  In upholding CADA’s application to Phillips, the 
Colorado Court of Appeals cited Jaycees along with race-discrimination 
precedents when it observed, “The Supreme Court has consistently 
recognized that states have a compelling interest in eliminating such 
discrimination and that statutes like CADA further that interest.”62  Before 
the U.S. Supreme Court, Craig, Mullins, and the CCRC enlisted Jaycees to 
support their argument that CADA was constitutional given the 
government’s “compelling interest”63 in preventing the “unique evils” 
caused by acts of invidious discrimination in the distribution of publicly 
available goods, services, and other advantages.64 
Their amicus, the NWLC, described Jaycees as a “lodestar case,” in which 
the Court held that the Jaycees’s objections to admitting women to full 
membership did not prevail against the state’s interest in preventing 
discrimination in “the public marketplace.”65  The brief argued that the 
state’s interest was equally compelling in preventing discrimination based on 
sexual orientation and gender identity and that the Court should reject the 
Department of Justice’s contention in their amicus brief that race 
discrimination presented a special case.66  The NWLC brief also sought to 
explain why ending pervasive discrimination against women in public 
accommodations in the marketplace was “fundamental” to women’s equality 
 
Support of Petitioners at 27–28, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111) (arguing 
that “[t]here is no LGBT analog here to the Piggie Park case” because there is no “bare refusal 
to serve LGBT customers”). 
 58. Brief for the States of Texas et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 3, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111) (“Public-accommodations concerns of 
past eras are not present here . . . .”). 
 59. 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
 60. 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam). 
 61. Id. at 402 n.5; see Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense & Educational 
Fund, Inc. in Support of Respondents, supra note 57, at 13. 
 62. Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 293 (Colo. App. 2015), rev’d, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719. 
 63. Brief for Respondent Colorado Civil Rights Commission at 23, Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111) (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 
(1984)). 
 64. Brief for Respondents Charlie Craig and David Mullins at 37–39, Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111) (quoting Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 628). 
 65. Brief Amici Curiae of the NWLC, supra note 54, at 18. 
 66. Id. at 5. 
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and to women’s full participation in a free and equal society.67  The brief 
argued that as state public accommodations laws expanded to include “sex” 
they helped to remove barriers to such full participation.68  But, offering 
various real and hypothetical examples of refusals of goods, services, and 
employment opportunities, motivated by beliefs about women’s proper roles, 
the brief cautioned that if the Court allowed the First Amendment to be a 
shield for sex discrimination by adopting expansive exemptions from such 
state laws, it could roll back such progress.69  In other words, the brief made 
sex discrimination not merely of historical interest, but a live concern. 
B.  The Opinion:  The Invisibility of Sex Discrimination 
In Justice Anthony Kennedy’s fifth and final majority opinion concerning 
the constitutional and civil rights of LGBT persons,70 the Court’s decision in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop seemed both to accept and express caution about the 
race analogy.  The Court ultimately reversed the Colorado Court of Appeals 
because the CCRC showed hostility toward and “disparaged” Phillips’s 
religious beliefs and revealed its bias by analogizing his beliefs to religious 
defenses of slavery and characterizing his invocation of freedom of religion 
as a “despicable piece[] of rhetoric” to justify discrimination.71  On the one 
hand, Kennedy stated, “The religious and philosophical objections to gay 
marriage are protected views and in some instances protected forms of 
expression.”72  On the other hand, Kennedy cited Piggie Park in explaining 
the “general rule” that acting on such objections was a different matter: 
Nevertheless, while those religious and philosophical objections are 
protected, it is a general rule that such objections do not allow business 
owners and other actors in the economy and in society to deny protected 
persons equal access to goods and services under a neutral and generally 
applicable public accommodations law.73 
Joined by Justice Breyer in her concurrence, Justice Kagan read Piggie 
Park as illustrating the Court’s longstanding jurisprudence that “a vendor 
cannot escape a public accommodations law because his religion disapproves 
selling a product to a group of customers, whether defined by sexual 
orientation, race, sex, or other protected trait.”74  Justice Kagan’s inclusion 
of “sex” in this list warrants comment.  Title II does not include “sex.”  
Rather, Title II’s four prohibited categories are race, color, religion, and 
 
 67. Id. at 6. 
 68. Id. at 11–13. 
 69. Id. at 22, 32–36. 
 70. I should make clear that Justice Kennedy never used the acronym “LGBT” in these 
opinions; in Masterpiece Cakeshop, he refers to “gay persons” and “gay couples.” 
 71. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1721, 1729 
(2018). 
 72. Id. at 1727. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 1733 n.* (Kagan, J., concurring). 
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national origin.  By comparison, most state public accommodations laws 
have expanded beyond such categories to include “sex.”75 
In the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy observed that Colorado adopted 
a public accommodations law in 1885 that guaranteed “‘full and equal 
enjoyment’ of certain public facilities to ‘all citizens,’ ‘regardless of race, 
color or previous condition of servitude.’”76  Kennedy noted that, in 2007 
and 2008, CADA was amended to add “sexual orientation” to the list of 
protected characteristics.77  He skipped over when “sex” was added to the 
list, but NWLC’s brief filled in that blank, citing a 1969 amendment that 
added “sex” as a protected characteristic.78  Evidently, Colorado was the first 
state to do so.79 
In Jaycees, the Supreme Court noted that Minnesota prohibited sex 
discrimination in 1973, nearly a century after it first adopted a statute 
prohibiting racial discrimination in public accommodations.80  By enlisting 
Piggie Park as affirming a vendor’s general obligation to provide goods and 
services despite religious or other objections, both Kennedy and Kagan 
indicated the common, legitimate concerns of federal and state public 
accommodations law, despite the broader and evolving reach of the latter. 
III.  THE JAYCEES LITIGATION 
In Jaycees, the Supreme Court considered the question of whether 
Minnesota reached too far in applying its relatively recent prohibition of sex 
discrimination in public accommodations to the Jaycees’s two-tiered 
membership practices.  Young men between the ages of eighteen and thirty-
five were eligible for full membership in the Jaycees; women and older men 
could be “associate members” who paid lower dues but could not “vote, hold 
local or national office, or participate in certain leadership training and 
awards programs.”81  Since the Jaycees defended this membership structure 
as necessary for its purposes, it bears quoting them.  Founded as the Junior 
Chamber of Commerce in 1920, the Jaycees’s objective, as stated in its 
bylaws, was to pursue 
such educational and charitable purposes as will promote and foster the 
growth and development of young men’s civic organizations in the United 
States, designed to inculcate in the individual membership of such 
 
 75. See Elizabeth Sepper, The Role of Religion in State Public Accommodations Laws, 60 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 631, 636 n.17 (2016). 
 76. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1725 (quoting 1885 Colo. Sess. Laws 132–33). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Brief Amici Curiae of the NWLC, supra note 54, at 12. 
 79. Elizabeth Sepper & Deborah Dinner, Sex in Public, 129 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 
2019) (manuscript at 27), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3344715 
[https://perma.cc/7HRK-PZDH]. 
 80. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624 (1984) (explaining that such nineteenth-
century state laws were in response to the Court’s 1883 opinion in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 
U.S. 3 (1883), which invalidated a federal public accommodations statute (the Civil Rights 
Act of 1875), but noted the existence of state public accommodations laws that imposed “a 
variety of equal access obligations”). 
 81. Id. at 613. 
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organization a spirit of genuine Americanism and civil interest, and as a 
supplementary education institution to provide them with opportunity for 
personal development and achievement and an avenue for intelligent 
participation by young men in the affairs of their community, state and 
nation, and to develop true friendship and understanding among young men 
of all nations.82 
Contrary to established policies, two local Minnesota chapters in 
Minneapolis and St. Paul admitted women as full members.83  Faced with 
sanctions and the threat of charter revocation by U.S. Jaycees—the 
organization’s national body—the chapters filed charges of discrimination 
with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights, arguing the sanctions 
imposed by the national body violated Minnesota’s public accommodations 
law.84  In turn, U.S. Jaycees brought a federal lawsuit to prevent enforcement 
of the public accommodations law against the Jaycees, asserting First 
Amendment rights to free speech and association.85  The federal district court 
in Minnesota ruled that Minnesota could apply its law to the Jaycees, but the 
Eighth Circuit reversed.86 
Compared to the thousands of pages of arguments contributed by the 
parties and their numerous amici in Masterpiece Cakeshop, the amicus briefs 
filed in Jaycees form a modest pile.  Eight amicus briefs filed on behalf of 
Roberts, the acting Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human 
Rights, urged the Supreme Court to reverse the decision of the Eighth 
Circuit.87  Three amicus briefs filed on behalf of the Jaycees urged the 
Supreme Court to affirm.88  This Part compares arguments about the 
following questions:  (1) Are the Jaycees just like the NAACP, and does an 
organization’s purpose matter to whether it has a First Amendment right to 
freedom of association? (2) Are women excluded from full membership in 
the Jaycees like racial minorities excluded from all-white groups or spaces, 
and does a state have a similarly compelling interest in ending both forms of 
exclusion? (3) What would be the effects of a ruling requiring the Jaycees to 
change its membership policies, and what are the implications for other 
associations?  To allude to this Article’s title, was “male chauvinism” indeed 
under attack as the Jaycees defended the legitimacy of devoting itself to 
advancing “the interests of young men only”?89 
 
 82. Id. at 612–13. 
 83. Id. at 614. 
 84. Id. at 614–15. 
 85. Id. at 615. 
 86. U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 534 F. Supp. 766, 774 (D. Minn. 1982), rev’d, 709 F.2d 
1560 (8th Cir. 1983), rev’d sub nom. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
 87. See Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 611 n.*. 
 88. See id. 
 89. See infra Part III.C.2–3. 
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A.  Are the Jaycees Just Like the NAACP and Does It Matter for Purposes 
of the Reach of the Freedom of Association? 
Both sides recognized the importance of NAACP v. Alabama but employed 
it in strikingly different ways.  The Jaycees and their amici drew parallels 
between the Jaycees and the NAACP, arguing that, in both instances, public 
hostility toward an organization’s purposes fortified the need for First 
Amendment protection.  Minnesota and its amici rejected such parallels 
between an organization fighting race discrimination and one engaging in sex 
discrimination.  They warned against turning freedom of association from a 
shield for political dissent into a sword. 
1.  Appellees and Their Amici:  The Jaycees and the NAACP Are Similar 
Both the Jaycees and Rotary International—a male-only club that filed an 
amicus brief supporting the Jaycees’s position—insisted that the Jaycees 
were in a similar position to that of the NAACP in the 1950s, when the Court 
held that mandating disclosure of the NAACP’s membership list in Alabama 
would infringe its constitutional freedom of association.90  The Jaycees and 
Rotary compared the present hostility toward their men-only membership 
rules to that exhibited toward the NAACP in the 1950s.  In doing so, Rotary 
insisted that freedom of association does not hinge on societal perceptions of 
a group’s positions: 
At the present time, male-only organizations such as the Jaycees and Rotary 
are encountering governmental and social hostility akin to that directed at 
the NAACP in the 1960’s.  However, it will not do to assert that because 
the male versus female discrimination practiced by such organizations is 
perceived as wicked, it is undeserving of constitutional protection.  The 
First Amendment is both color-blind and gender-blind.  Freedom of 
association and the other rights protected by that amendment are protected 
whether the group invoking the Constitution is perceived as “good” or 
“bad,” “right” or “wrong.”  Constitutional liberties are guarded regardless 
of whose ox is being gored.91 
The Rotary brief did not stop with this historical comparison.  It suggested 
that the NAACP remained unpopular.  In contesting the appellees’ argument 
that invidious discrimination does not deserve First Amendment protection, 
Rotary suggested that the NAACP itself took invidious positions: 
The aggressive policies of the NAACP on behalf of blacks have assuredly 
caused discontent, animosity, and, in the case of affirmative action 
programs, envy among many white Americans.  But the fact that the 
NAACP restricts its activities to the advancement of the cause of blacks 
has not caused it to lose its First Amendment right.92 
 
 90. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 339, 446 (1958). 
 91. Amicus Curiae Brief of Rotary International, supra note 37, at *26–27. 
 92. Id. at *26 (citing the dictionary definition of “invidious” as “tending to cause 
discontent, animosity, or envy”). 
2398 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 
Rotary argued that, absent the unpopularity of the NAACP’s positions, the 
Court would not have recognized their rights as requiring protection.93  The 
Jaycees enlisted NAACP v. Alabama to argue that its socially disfavored 
purpose—promoting the interests of young men—should not affect its First 
Amendment rights.94 
So too, Rotary reasoned, the perception of “men-only organizations” as 
part and parcel of “male chauvinism” should not rob them of First 
Amendment protection: 
The Court may take judicial notice that “male chauvinism” is under attack 
from all sides at present.  Defense of men-only organizations is not popular, 
and even the ACLU, famed for its defense of the rights of the American 
Nazi Party, has seen fit to join the women in the attack against the Jaycees.  
The climate of the times may be on the side of “equal rights.”  But if the 
precious freedoms protected by the First Amendment may be swept away 
whenever one of those is involved in an unpopular cause, then this great 
land is further down the road to a fictional 1984 than most of its citizens 
would wish to travel.95 
Rotary’s argument resembles the premise that the First Amendment protects 
expressing “the thought that we hate.”96 
The Jaycees denied that they practiced “invidious” discrimination, and 
they objected to appellants’ invocation of discrimination precedents like 
Runyon v. McCrary:  “The use of this term [invidious discrimination] is 
apparently intended to suggest that the Jaycees all-male membership policy 
is somehow immoral and unsavory and therefore not entitled to protection 
against the State’s police powers.”97  In striking language that prefigures 
Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent in United States v. Windsor,98 the Jaycees 
spoke of the attempted analogies between sex and race as “attempts to tar the 
Jaycees with the brush of ‘invidious discrimination’” and asserted that that 
race-discrimination context does not apply to the Jaycees’s “benign 
policy.”99 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Brief of Appellee, the United States Jaycees, Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 
(1984) (No. 83-724), 1984 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 237, at *22–23 (“The fact that the 
Jaycees’ central purpose may not, in this period of history, appear as important as that of the 
NAACP provides no invitation to state power.  Justice Harlan stated in NAACP v. Alabama 
that the nature of the beliefs sought to be advanced by association was ‘immaterial.’”). 
 95. Amicus Curiae Brief of Rotary International, supra note 37, at *36.  In support, Rotary 
enlists NAACP v. Button, in which Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. criticized “selective 
enforcement” of “vague and broad” statutes “against unpopular causes.” Id. (quoting NAACP 
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 435 (1963)). 
 96. See United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting); 
supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 97. Brief of Appellee, the United States Jaycees, supra note 94, at *23. 
 98. 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
 99. Brief of Appellee, the United States Jaycees, supra note 94, at *25.  Compare id., with 
Windsor, 570 U.S. at 776 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“I would not tar the political branches 
with the brush of bigotry.”). 
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2.  Appellants:  The NAACP and the Jaycees Are Different—Freedom of 
Association Is a Shield, Not a Sword 
The appellants and their amici vehemently resisted the Jaycees comparing 
itself to the NAACP and enlisting NAACP v. Alabama to defend its 
membership practices, would turn freedom of association into a sword, not a 
shield.  Appellants countered that Runyon was the more apt precedent:  “The 
Jaycees’ claim that freedom of association protects its denial of equal access 
to women should be rejected on the same basis that this Court rejected the 
claim of parents in [Runyon] that associational freedom insulated their 
racially motivated practice of denying educational opportunities to black 
children.”100  In effect, the Jaycees were more like the segregationist groups 
the NAACP and other civil rights groups challenged. 
Appellants and their amici strenuously disagreed with the Eighth Circuit’s 
ruling that requiring the Jaycees to admit women to full membership would 
impair the First Amendment rights of its members.  The National 
Organization for Women (NOW) and other feminist groups argued that 
NAACP v. Alabama held that “[f]or group activity to be protected, it must 
embody appropriate First Amendment content.”101  Thus, “[t]he Jaycees does 
not enjoy a constitutional shield for its discriminatory practices simply 
because its members have joined together to hone their career skills, provide 
themselves with civic exposure, and enhance their opportunities in the 
business world.”102 
Appellants insisted that NAACP v. Alabama showed that the Court had not 
recognized freedom of association as an independent First Amendment right 
but instead as a derivative right necessary to protect enumerated First 
Amendment rights, such as freedom of speech and freedom of assembly.103  
The Court protected that derivative right because compelling the NAACP to 
disclose its membership lists would “chill or impede the NAACP’s exercise 
of free speech and assembly” in “an atmosphere of racial animosity,” where 
members “faced economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical 
coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility.”104  The Jaycees faced 
no such threat to an enumerated right.105 
The National League of Cities elaborated on this lack of threat, stressing 
the Jaycees’s comparative popularity: 
[M]embers of unpopular groups [like the NAACP] were threatened with 
devastating retaliation if their names or affiliations were revealed pursuant 
to state law.  Such retaliation would have made it impossible for the 
members to continue to associate with the groups or advocate the groups’ 
beliefs. . . . 
 
 100. Appellants’ Brief, Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (No. 83-724), 1984 
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 227, at *34. 
 101. Brief Amicus Curiae of NOW, supra note 36, at *33–34. 
 102. Id. at *34. 
 103. Appellants’ Brief, supra note 100, at *29–31. 
 104. Id. at *27–28. 
 105. Id. at *30–31. 
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[The present case] concerns an enormously popular group, which has a 
huge membership predominantly comprised of employees and leaders of 
the powerful American business community.  The prospect that the 
regulation at issue will lead to retaliation against the Jaycees or its members 
is nil.  The threat to a right to associate with the group or advocate its 
positions is correspondingly nil.106 
In distinguishing NAACP v. Alabama, the ACLU argued that the purpose of 
freedom of association was to preserve diversity by protecting minority and 
dissident expression and advocacy from “suppression by the powerful.”107  It 
warned that an “unbounded freedom to dis-associate would cripple the 
guarantees of equality contained in the Constitution and our Civil Rights 
statutes, since every ban on discrimination would be checkmated by an 
assertion of individual autonomy phrased as a claim of associational 
freedom.”108 
Foreshadowing the Court’s rationale, the ACLU argued that the Jaycees’s 
freedom of association was only minimally impacted by having to admit 
women to full membership.109  It argued that, in reaching a contrary 
conclusion, the Eighth Circuit impermissibly engaged in “sex stereotyping” 
and advanced an “unsupported hypothesis” that the “systemic relegation” of 
female Jaycees members to “inferior roles” within the Jaycees was necessary 
to the organization’s expression and advocacy.110  By doing so, the Eighth 
Circuit wielded “the traditional shield of freedom of association” as a sword 
against “excluded or subordinated groups,” which the U.S. Supreme Court 
had expressly held was impermissible even if protected ideas about 
“exclusionary practices” were involved.111 
In deploying this shield-to-sword image, appellants and their amici 
repeatedly invoked Norwood and Runyon, in which the Court rejected the 
argument that “[t]he practice of racial segregation . . . was sheltered as a form 
of constitutionally protected association.”112  They reminded the Court that 
“[i]nvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of 
exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it 
has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections.”113 
 
 106. Brief for the National League of Cities et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants, 
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (No. 83-724), 1984 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 
232, at *30–31. 
 107. Brief Amicus Curiae of American Civil Liberties Union and Minnesota Civil Liberties 
Union in Support of Appellants, Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (No. 83-724), 1984 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs 
LEXIS 229, at *13 [hereinafter Brief Amicus Curiae of ACLU]. 
 108. Id. at *9. 
 109. Id. at *13–14; see supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 110. Brief Amicus Curiae of ACLU, supra note 107, at *15. 
 111. Id. at *6–7. 
 112. Appellants’ Brief, supra note 100, at *24–25 (citing Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 
455, 470 (1973)). 
 113. Id. at *25 (quoting Norwood, 413 U.S. at 470). 
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B.  The Harms to Women from Unequal Access to the Marketplace— 
and to Jaycees Membership 
The Eighth Circuit concluded that Minnesota’s interest was not 
sufficiently compelling to override the infringement on the Jaycees’s 
associational rights given that, among other things, the record did not show 
that “membership in the Jaycees was the only practicable way for a woman 
to advance herself in business or professional life.”114  On appeal, the 
appellants and their amici argued that the Eighth Circuit failed to apply the 
proper test and to appreciate the nature and extent of the harm that women 
experienced from that unequal membership structure.  This section highlights 
both the analogies drawn between race and sex discrimination and the more 
gender-specific argument about the significance of the Jaycees (as part of the 
old boys network) as an avenue to professional success. 
1.  The Jaycees:  This Is a Case of “Relatively Minor Impediments” 
The Jaycees argued that the record on appeal did not support its “alleged 
exalted status in the power structure of American society” and that “[t]here 
is no evidence from which to conclude that Jaycee membership is the sine 
qua non of employment, promotion or ability to make potentially useful 
business contacts by men or women.”115  It painted a picture of the “virtually 
unlimited” ability of “women to make valuable contacts with other men and 
women” and have leadership experience in a myriad of organizations, 
including all-female ones.116  Amicus Boy Scouts of America (BSA) 
concurred that Minnesota’s interest aimed at “relatively minor impediments 
to a person’s desire for economic advancement or social recognition”; it 
could show “no more than that one of many possible means to a particular 
objective may be obstructed.”117 
2.  Appellants:  The Importance of Access 
While the Jaycees and their amici challenged the significance of regular 
membership in the Jaycees for women’s economic advancement, appellants 
and their amici situated the Jaycees in the context of a broader network of 
associations to which women had unequal (or no) access.  In stressing the 
harm to women from this inequality, they turned to the language of second-
class citizenship and to analogies between race- and sex-based exclusion. 
 
 114. U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1573 (8th Cir. 1983), rev’d sub nom. Roberts 
v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
 115. Brief of Appellee, the United States Jaycees, supra note 94, at *47. 
 116. Id. at *48. 
 117. Brief of the Boy Scouts of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance, 
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (No. 83-724), 1984 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 
234, at *42. 
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a.  Exclusion from the “Old Boys Network” 
Disagreeing with BSA, NOW put it bluntly:  one of the “most important 
services provided to [the Jaycees’s] members” is “an entree to the ‘Old Boys 
Network.’”118  As NOW explained: 
The Old Boys Network is that series of linkages with influential elders, 
ambitious peers and younger men on their way up which men develop as 
they move through school, work, professional and community service 
organizations, and private clubs.  It provides men with knowledgeable 
allies who help them to advance in their careers, teach them who the cast 
of characters is and how to behave in a new position, and assist them in 
getting the earliest news of job openings, business opportunities and 
financial grants.119 
NOW asserted that “[t]he importance of access to such a network cannot be 
overestimated,” citing a variety of sources confirming the critical role of 
networking to corporate advancement and of the “Old Boys Network” as a 
vital “power source” for men’s job advancement.120 
In arguing that women would benefit as much from these networks as men, 
NOW made a series of “sameness” arguments about the “growing 
convergence in men’s and women’s career and family goals” and the 
importance of mentorship for success for both men and women.121  
Prefiguring arguments decades later about why so few women in the pipeline 
make it to top management, NOW reported that a study of male and female 
college graduates from the classes of 1969 to 1972 “revealed that [they] 
chose the same types of jobs upon graduation” and that “there was no 
evidence that women work fewer hours or drop out of the labor force due to 
marriage or childbirth, explanations often given for the small representation 
of women in the ranks of management.”122  Instead, there was a “strong 
correlation between mentoring and success for women” and, likewise, a 
strong correlation between lack of mentoring and low success.123 
New York and California, as amici, also emphasized the significance of 
full membership in groups like the Jaycees:  “There is hardly a more 
important area of state concern than furtherance of the opportunities of all 
citizens to participate in educational, business and civic associations.”124  
They explained that, because “the systematic exclusion of women” from such 
organizations has impeded their “full participation . . . in our society,” New 
York and California, by aggressively enforcing their antidiscrimination laws 
 
 118. Brief Amicus Curiae of NOW, supra note 36, at *19. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at *19–21. 
 121. Id. at *21–22 (citing results of “numerous studies of college students” on converging 
interests and a Wellesley College Center for Research on Women report on the critical role of 
mentoring to success). 
 122. Id. at *22. 
 123. Id. at *22–23. 
 124. Amicus Curiae Brief of the State of New York, Joined by the State of California in 
Support of Reversal, Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (No. 83-724), 1984 U.S. 
S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 230, at *21. 
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and policies, “are firmly committed to altering this historical reality by 
requiring organizations which provide traditional avenues of professional 
advancement and community involvement to provide equal access to men 
and women.”125  In contrast, the Eighth Circuit “greatly undervalued” 
Minnesota’s interest, and the dissent correctly identified states’ “compelling 
interest in eradicating second-class citizenship in places of public 
accommodation.”126  In arguing that “allowing female citizens full and equal 
access to places of accommodation” was of utmost societal importance, the 
states observed that, when the New York State Legislature added “sex” to its 
public accommodations law in 1976, it found that “the failure to provide 
equal opportunity” posed a menace to a “free democratic state.”127 
Amici offered concrete examples of how the Jaycees offered unique 
opportunities for professional development.  In those local chapters where 
women enjoyed full membership, female Jaycees members testified to 
receiving promotions at work because of their involvement.128  Ms. Kathleen 
Hawn testified that her experience on the Jaycees board of directors 
developed her speaking and organization skills.129  Appellants, the 
Minnesota officials, also stressed the benefit of women and men working 
together as equals in a business setting.130  By comparison, they asserted, the 
inequality in Jaycees chapters that did not admit women to full membership 
reinforced stereotypes of men as leaders and women as followers: 
The Jaycees portrays itself as a breeding ground for tomorrow’s leaders.  If 
the state has a compelling interest in eliminating discrimination, it has an 
equal interest in ensuring that the formative experiences of future leaders 
include men and women working as equals on projects of leadership, 
development, community service, and civic betterment such as are engaged 
in by the Jaycees.  Jaycees’ by-laws which relegate women to followers and 
elevate men to leaders solely on the basis of an immutable characteristic 
are antithetical to that interest.131 
NOW argued that this hierarchical membership structure created a 
“‘together but unequal’ environment with many serious disadvantages to the 
second-class participants.”132  On one hand, it “create[d] feelings of 
inferiority in women,” while, on the other, it “reinforce[d] the handmaiden 
mentality in men—the notion that women are always the Women’s 
Auxiliary, there to serve without praise or pay.”133  The NAACP Legal 
Defense and Educational Fund similarly elaborated that excluding women 
from “informal centers of power” represented by all-male organizations like 
 
 125. Id. at *4. 
 126. Id. at *19. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief for Community Business 
Leaders as Amicus Curiae at 15, Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (No. 83-724). 
 129. Id. at 16. 
 130. Appellants’ Brief, supra note 100, at *40 n.15. 
 131. Id. (citation omitted). 
 132. Brief Amicus Curiae of NOW, supra note 36, at *27. 
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the Jaycees reinforces perceptions of business as a masculine activity, 
substantiates harmful prejudices, inhibits women’s ability to succeed in 
business, and limits the aspirations of future generations.134 
b.  Race-Sex Analogies 
While appellants and their amici asserted gender-specific harms resulting 
from exclusion from full membership in the Jaycees as part of the old boys 
network, they also drew upon race-based analogies to emphasize the 
wrongness of unequal membership within the organization.  Appellants and 
their amici argued that the analogy between the harms of racial and sex 
discrimination in the market was strong, as was the government’s interest in 
each instance: 
Equality of access to the market place for women is a significant state 
interest.  No one can seriously dispute that “the deprivation of personal 
dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public 
establishments” is not felt as deeply by women so treated as by persons 
accorded it on the basis of color.135 
As discussed in Part I, the Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Jaycees 
would contain the same analogy and historical reference.136  The appellants 
drew on potent images of repudiated racial segregation in urging the Supreme 
Court to reject the Eighth Circuit’s finding that Minnesota had failed to 
demonstrate a compelling state interest because it did not show “that 
membership in the Jaycees was the only practicable way for a woman to 
advance herself in business or professional life.”137  Not only was this an 
overly narrow view of the state’s interest in ensuring equal access to 
commercial activities regardless of race, sex, or ethnicity, but it was based 
upon the rejected theory of “separate but equal.”  Appellants urged the Court 
not to allow women to be deprived of equal opportunity by a failed 
justification for racial inequality properly assigned to “the constitutional 
graveyard.”138 
In its statement of interest, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational 
Fund asserted the similarity between the kind of discrimination experienced 
by racial minorities and women in private organizations and clubs:  
“Discrimination against women among private organizations and clubs rests 
on the same ill-founded claims that are offered to defend racial discrimination 
in the same kinds of institutions.”139 
 
 134. Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Petitioner, Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (No. 83-724), 1984 U.S. 
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 135. Appellants’ Brief, supra note 100, at *36 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. 
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964)). 
 136. See supra Part I. 
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Other amici enlisted the Court’s race-discrimination precedents and its 
Equal Protection sex-discrimination precedents to label the Jaycees’s 
discriminatory membership as “invidious” and counter the Jaycees’s 
argument that it was a “single gender” organization whose freedom of 
association would be violated by admitting women.140  The Alliance for 
Women’s Membership argued that it was the women excluded from full 
membership who were being denied freedom of association because of the 
toll taken by such “invidious discrimination.”141  After critiquing the unequal 
access to opportunities for female Jaycees members, the Alliance added:  
“Women may be confined to the back of the Jaycees bus, but they are fully 
associated in every way with the Jaycees organization.”142 
C.  Debating Whether Admitting Women as Full Members Will 
Harm the Jaycees 
A third debated issue was whether the Jaycees would be harmed by 
admitting women to full, rather than associate, membership.  Answering that 
question partly turned on whether the Jaycees was truly a “men’s 
organization” with purposes unique to the advancement of young men’s 
interests and rooted in ideas about gender difference and the desire for all-
male or all-female associations.  The issue also arose at oral argument, in 
which the justices debated whether a group need be committed to the cause 
of “male chauvinism” to be harmed by admitting women as full members.143 
1.  The Jaycees and Their Amici Defend Advancing 
the “Interests of Young Men Only” 
The Jaycees contended that compliance with Minnesota’s public 
accommodations law—requiring it to serve the interests of young women, 
along with those of young men—would destroy the organization’s ability to 
achieve its “core purpose”:  “to provide young men with an opportunity for 
personal development and achievement through participation in the affairs of 
their community, state and nation.”144  They argued that the organization 
serves as a spokesman—a “representative voice”—for young men and 
speaks out on controversial issues.145  The Jaycees warned that a ruling 
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against them would destroy the associational purposes and freedoms of a 
wide range of groups.  For example, “all-female groups may be forced to 
serve the interests of men” and “all-Black groups may be compelled to take 
on the burden of serving the special interest of white people,” not to mention 
the toll taken on various “racially, religiously and ethnically restricted 
associations.”146  Invoking Alexis de Tocqueville’s classic comment about 
the propensity of Americans to form a myriad of associations, the Jaycees 
contended that Minnesota “[sought] a rule of constitutional law which would 
stifle this pluralism in the name of a misbegotten concept of 
egalitarianism.”147  Rotary similarly appealed to pluralism:  “The State of 
Minnesota seeks to compel homogeneity which is the antithesis of freedom 
of association and runs counter to the pluralism which is one of America’s 
strengths.”148 
With another nod to de Tocqueville, the BSA denied that Minnesota had a 
sufficiently compelling interest to intrude on freedom of association—a 
“pillar of our pluralistic society” and a bulwark differentiating “our society 
from totalitarian regimes.”149  Having seen its own membership policies 
excluding “homosexuals or women from certain leadership positions” 
successfully challenged in court under some other states’ public 
accommodations laws, the BSA urged the Court not to adopt such a “stunted 
concept of the nature and scope of associational freedom.”150 
The brief of the Conference of Private Organizations turned to gender 
difference and “like seeking like” to deny that the Jaycees accorded women 
second-class membership status.  It argued that many “[f]raternals, social 
clubs, and civic and service organizations . . . sponsor specific programs 
open to the general public,” and those allowed to participate did not become 
“second class” members by doing so.151  Further, “sponsorship of such 
programs should not destroy [the groups’] right to maintain their restricted-
class membership policies for strictly member functions.”152  Beliefs in 
gender differences and gender complementarity, it asserted, explain the 
parallel existence of fraternal societies by “working men” and women’s (and 
sometimes children’s) auxiliaries: 
[S]uch [fraternal] associations have generally been limited to men.  
However, similar sororal societies, based on a like spirit of kinship, 
 
 146. Id. at *19, *21. 
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sociability and mutuality, and carrying out comparable, but distinct, 
benevolent, social and philanthropic programs, exist for women. 
Social clubs also depend heavily on common bonds among members to 
achieve their purposes. . . . Because men and women members often 
perceive that they have different interests and objectives, club membership 
is frequently all-male or all-female.  Class restrictions of this type are often 
thought to be essential for achieving the goals of a social club . . . .153 
The Conference insisted that those who adhere to this view of gender deserve 
protection even if “times have changed” and this view is “undoubtedly less 
universal that it once was”: 
However foolish it may seem to some, it is widely believed by members of 
some fraternals and clubs that the roles of men and women in society are 
different, and that the organizations through which men and women strive 
for personal development should reflect that difference. . . .  [T]hat 
philosophy still plays an important role in the lives of millions of 
“traditional” families.  [It] inspires such . . . clubs to provide civic, public, 
eleemosynary and social benefits which contribute significantly to the 
common weal.  The expression and practice of this philosophy . . . are as 
deserving of protection under the freedom of association guarantee as the 
communications activities of such organizations.154 
To establish the legitimacy of single-gender organizations, the Conference 
cited Congress’ chartering of the BSA and the Girl Scouts of America.155 
Although Minnesota’s public accommodations law clearly excluded 
private clubs, the Conference segued to the Jaycees:  the Jaycees’s “positions 
are inherently a product of the common bond among the members, which 
includes the restrictions on voting, policymaking and leadership by certain 
age groups and by women.”156 
2.  Disputing that the Jaycees Was Truly a “Men’s Organization” 
Appellants and their amici argued that admitting women to full 
membership would not impair the Jaycees’s organizational goals, a theme 
later sounded in the Court’s majority opinion.  NOW argued that the 
Jaycees’s admission of women as associate members was evidence that it 
was “not in fact the men’s organization that it purports to be.”157  Further, 
the “‘Jaycee Creed’ . . . contains nothing that espouses discrimination on the 
basis of sex” and “nothing that the Jaycees does . . . is uniquely related to the 
interest of men.”158  NOW urged the Court to reject the Jaycees’s argument 
that a ruling in favor of Minnesota raised “the specter of Minnesota’s 
invading all kinds of membership organizations, from B’nai Brith to the 
Polish Women’s Alliance.”159  Instead, to insist that the Jaycees “eliminate 
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women’s second class status” within its organization neither “drastically 
alters” the Jaycees’s nature, nor “threatens the identity of other truly 
homogenous groups.”160 
Once again, analogies to race-discrimination precedents in which the 
Court rejected freedom of association claims played a part.  The appellants 
asserted that, as in Runyon, “the record does not show that the advocacy by 
the Jaycees of any of its beliefs, or indeed its exercise of any other first 
amendment freedom, would be impaired by giving women full membership 
rights.”161  “Allowing women to vote, hold office, and receive awards,” the 
brief insisted, “will . . . change nothing about the organization except its 
sexually restrictive nature.”162 
3.  The Oral Argument:  Was the Jaycees “an Organization 
of Male Chauvinists”? 
At the oral argument, the justices pressed counsel for the Jaycees about the 
claim that admitting women to full membership would injure the Jaycees’s 
purpose.  Counsel Carl D. Hall, Jr. argued that it is “only rational to assume 
that” an organization “dedicated to voting the interests of men” would 
“undergo a substantial change” if it admitted women.163  Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist countered that it seemed that it would “depend on the 
nature of the organization.”164  He illustrated his point with a hypothetical 
“organization of all male stockbrokers that are concerned solely with the 
business of stockbrokering.”165  He noted that there are minimal differences 
between men and women in the focus on stockbroking, such that requiring 
female admission would not significantly impact the organization’s 
purpose.166  Conversely, Chief Justice Rehnquist posited: 
[I]f you have an organization of male chauvinists that says we’re tired of 
this affirmative action in favor of women, we want what we think is a 
square deal, it seems to me there you get a different thing. 
But you haven’t really shown that the Jaycees are in the latter category 
at all, that they espouse anything close to men’s rights or the kind of issues 
that men and women might feel differently about.167 
Hall answered by repeating that, similar to women’s organizations whose 
core purposes were to advance women, the Jaycees’s main purpose was to 
advance the interests of young men.168  He continued by arguing that, just as 
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such women’s organizations would change by admitting men, so too would 
the Jaycees.169  When Rehnquist later asked if there was a relevant distinction 
between the Jaycees and a hypothetical “National Organization of Men, that 
[is] anti-affirmative action, anti-ERA, and so forth,” Hall answered:  “It 
seems irrational to assume that this organization, to continue as an all-male 
organization, has to deliberately take positions on ERA or abortion in order 
to show how anti-woman it is.”170  Hall once again pointed out that “all-
women organizations” are “accepted”; so too, he argued should be “all-male 
organization[s].”171  Justice John Paul Stevens pointed out that organizations 
to which Hall pointed, such as NOW, had women and men among their 
members.172 
In an exchange that made the newspapers, Justice Thurgood Marshall 
asked, “Aren’t you just afraid that the women will ‘take over’?”  Hall 
conceded that this “may be a possible fear” but that “it’s the kind of fear that 
would be legitimately protected by any group.”173  Justice Byron White 
pressed the issue, observing that, while Hall asserted that the Jaycees’s 
purpose was to promote the interests of young men, none of the Jaycees’s 
public positions could be identified as promoting such interests “as 
distinguished from young women.”174  Hall shifted gears by arguing that 
taking positions on issues is only “one part of the way in which young men 
are developed”; others include “running projects” that benefit the 
community.175  To that, Justice Stevens observed that if such projects are 
“designed to teach [men] to be good, effective executives,” then would not 
women “learn exactly the same way”?176  Hall admitted that women, as 
associate members, did participate in such programs, but they could not vote, 
control policy, or hold office.177  This led Justice Marshall to quip:  “Well, 
tell me, what other right do they have, other than to pay their dues?”178 
Also reported was the questioning pursued by Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor—then the only female justice on the Court—about the analogy to 
race-based refusals of service in public accommodations.  When Hall 
invoked Supreme Court privacy precedents,179 Justice O’Connor observed 
that there were “businesses that said we don’t want to serve blacks,” but “this 
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Court has said that the state’s interest in eliminating discrimination is enough 
to put a stop to that.”180  When Hall tried to distinguish the “private 
associational characteristics” of the Jaycees from “sharing a plate of food in 
a restaurant,” Justice O’Connor retorted:  “Don’t you think those were the 
arguments that were made in those cases?”181 
D.  The Supreme Court Rules 
It is worth reiterating that both the Court’s majority opinion and Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence in Jaycees have proven to be treasure troves of 
nuggets enlisted to support freedom of association182 and the basic 
legitimacy and compelling nature of the government’s interest in 
“eradicating discrimination against its female citizens” as well as, by 
analogy, other marginalized populations.183  The Court accepted Minnesota’s 
“functional definition” of public accommodations184 to reach groups like the 
Jaycees because “leadership skills are ‘goods’ [and] business contacts and 
employment promotions are ‘privileges’ and ‘advantages,’”185 such that the 
state has a compelling interest in ensuring that women have equal access to 
such goods, privileges, and advantages.186 
The Court included NAACP v. Alabama among its many precedents 
establishing that “certain kinds of personal bonds have played a critical role 
in the culture and traditions of the Nation by cultivating and transmitting 
shared ideals and beliefs” and, in so doing, “foster diversity and act as critical 
buffers between the individual and the power of the State.”187  The Jaycees 
chapters, “large and basically unselective groups,” “clearly” fell outside of 
this category of “relationships worthy of this kind of constitutional 
protection.”188 
The Court elaborated on the freedom of association for purposes of 
political expression:  “According protection to collective effort on behalf of 
shared goals is especially important in preserving political and cultural 
diversity and in shielding dissident expression from suppression by the 
majority.”189  In its majority opinion, the Court concluded that some of the 
Jaycees’s activities implicated this right but added that the right was not 
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absolute and could be infringed to “serve compelling state interests.”190  
Minnesota, the Court concluded, had such an interest:  its public 
accommodations law “reflects the State’s strong historical commitment to 
eliminating discrimination and assuring its citizens equal access to publicly 
available goods and services.  That goal, which is unrelated to the 
suppression of expression, plainly serves compelling state interests of the 
highest order.”191 
The Court, unlike the Eighth Circuit, did not require Minnesota to establish 
that full membership in the Jaycees was the only route to professional 
advancement.  Notably, in reiterating that Minnesota’s law “protects the 
State’s citizenry from a number of serious social and personal harms,” the 
majority raised the concern over stereotyping and its impact on dignity in its 
own Equal Protection jurisprudence: 
[T]his Court has frequently noted that discrimination based on archaic and 
overbroad assumptions about the relative needs and capacities of the sexes 
forces individuals to labor under stereotypical notions that often bear no 
relationship to their actual abilities.  It thereby both deprives persons of 
their individual dignity and denies society the benefits of wide participation 
in political, economic, and cultural life.192 
Concern over stereotyping also played a role in one of the most 
controversial parts of the majority opinion.  The Court concluded there was 
“no basis in the record for concluding that admission of women as full voting 
members will impede the organization’s ability to engage in protected [First 
Amendment] activities or to disseminate its preferred views.”193  The Court 
argued that Minnesota’s law “requires no change in the Jaycees’s creed of 
promoting the interest of young men” or any restriction on excluding 
members who do not share the Jaycees’s “ideologies or philosophies.”194 
Indeed, the Court stated that, in arguing that women might differ on some 
of the issues on which the Jaycees had expressed a position (such as “the 
federal budget, school prayer, voting rights, and foreign relations”), the 
Jaycees “relie[d] solely on unsupported generalizations about the relative 
interests and perspectives of men and women.”195  Without a more 
substantial showing, the Court “decline[d] to indulge in the sexual 
stereotyping” underlying the Jaycees’s contention that if women were 
permitted to vote, it would “change the content or impact of the 
organization’s speech.”196  Citing Hishon v. King & Spalding,197 the Jaycees 
majority stated that the Jaycees “failed to demonstrate that [Minnesota’s law] 
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imposed any serious burdens on the male members’ freedom of expressive 
association.”198 
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence is an equally rich source for statements in 
support of state antidiscrimination law.199  But O’Connor eschews the 
majority’s inquiry into whether an organization’s expression will be 
altered.200  Instead, she urged a line-drawing test between “expressive 
associations” and “commercial associations.”201  Based on the record, she 
concluded the Jaycees chapters presented a “relatively easy case” for 
applying this dichotomy:  they fall on the commercial side.202  Their basic 
activities—recruiting members and selling membership as a “product”—are 
commercial.203 
IV.  WHITHER THE “OLD BOYS NETWORK” TODAY?  OLD AND NEW 
CHALLENGES 
In this final Part, I discuss the immediate impact of the Court’s decision 
on the U.S. Jaycees and its local chapters, drawing on newspaper accounts.  
I observe that concerns over the problem of the old boys network are not just 
a thing of the past, as efforts to counter effects of such networks with woman-
centered networks indicate.  I identify some remaining challenges at the 
intersection of freedom of association and freedom from discrimination. 
A.  The Immediate Aftermath of Jaycees 
In its Jaycees opinion, the Court noted that, in 1981, the Jaycees “had 
approximately 295,000 members in 7,400 local chapters affiliated with 51 
state organizations” and “about 11,915 associate members.”204  Women 
associate members accounted for 2 percent of total membership.205  On 
August 16, 1984, about one month after the Court’s ruling, U.S. Jaycees 
“overwhelmingly approved a resolution allowing women full 
membership.”206  The Jaycees’s president, Tommy Todd, stated that the 
organization was “in no way compelled to do this” but instead it was “an 
‘opportune time’ to set ‘a direction for others to follow.’”207  However, 
another Jaycees official observed that thirty-seven states, like Minnesota, 
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included “sex” in their public accommodations laws, and so:  “If we vote 
against this, we’re sued into oblivion.”208 
News coverage after this vote included pictures of smiling and laughing 
women and men together as the former were sworn in to full membership in 
various Jaycees chapters or toasted by their male colleagues.209  Some 
chapters admitted women grudgingly, while some chose to disband rather 
than admit women.  As the president of the disbanded Zilwaukee, Michigan, 
chapter explained:  “I like a night out with the guys after the work’s done.”210  
In contrast, some local chapters that had “been quietly admitting women” as 
full members for some time could now do so openly.211  Some news stories 
pondered the fate of the local chapters of the all-female U.S. Jaycee Women, 
which had been formed by the Jaycees in the 1970s to make women’s 
presence official:  would they disband all-women organizations and form 
newly integrated chapters or would they continue, but with full membership 
privileges?212  Reprising some of the themes in the briefs, Phyllis Marron, 
president of the Prince George’s Jaycee Women, reported that “[s]ome 
women prefer to participate in an-all women’s group.”213  Notably, one 
reason she gave was that the chapters did programming around “women’s 
health issues as well as on rape, battered wives, self-protection and job-
related stress”—and “[a] lot of women feel more comfortable discussing 
these topics with women only.”214  Other media stories debated the merits of 
all-female networking groups, or whether membership in groups like the 
Jaycees was needed to break into the “‘old boy network,’ which can lead to 
career advancement.”215 
Less than one year later, this debate became moot.  The U.S. Jaycee 
Women decided to disband “because most of the group’s members have 
joined the formerly all-male Jaycees.”216  Echoing the words of the Jaycees’s 
president on the resolution to admit women, the president of U.S. Jaycee 
Women, Doris Gosnell, said that “[o]ur time is changing” and that the 
group’s leadership was recommending to its membership that “they begin the 
process of moving into the Jaycees framework.”217 
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B.  Remaining Challenges at the Intersection of Freedom of Association 
and Freedom from Discrimination 
Today, the Jaycees are not as prominent in the United States as they were 
in the 1980s.218  Existing chapters describe their purpose in gender-neutral 
terms:  providing “civic service” and “growing the skills of our members and 
providing an opportunity to make lifelong friendships.”219  Nonetheless, 
although the Jaycees is no longer a central symbol of the old boys network, 
the term has by no means been retired.  Like most public accommodations 
laws, Minnesota’s law excluded truly private clubs.220  At the time of the 
Jaycees decision, news coverage reported that feminists were taking aim at 
all-male clubs’ discriminatory policies because of the role of such clubs in 
advancing careers.221 
Over three decades later, some argue that all-male social clubs remain an 
important social network from which professional women are excluded.222  
The term “old boys network” has appeared in recent news reports about male 
clients’ strong preference for male attorneys to lead their cases as well as the 
obstacles women running for public office encounter.223  In response, one 
trend is to form women-centered networks to help women give and get peer 
mentorship, empower women in the workplace, and, as it were, “replicate the 
old boys club.”224 
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In 2018, the annual Women in the Workplace report found that, despite 
four years of verbal commitments to gender diversity, companies had not 
made meaningful progress.225  The report asserts that “[w]omen are doing 
their part”:  “They’ve been earning more bachelor’s degrees than men for 
decades.  They’re asking for promotions and negotiating salaries at the same 
rates as men.”226  Additionally, in an echo of NOW’s brief in Jaycees, 
“contrary to conventional wisdom, they are staying in the workforce at the 
same rate as men.”227  Yet they do not progress to top leadership positions 
within corporations.228  The report noted the path was even steeper and more 
stalled for women of color and lesbian women.229  Without explicitly 
mentioning the “old boys network,” the report mentioned various ways that 
women, especially women of color, received less support from managers 
than men do and were “more likely to say they never have informal 
interactions with senior leaders, such as casual conversations or lunch 
meetings,” or socialize with them outside of work.230  The vocabulary of 
gender and race discrimination is more sophisticated than it was at the time 
of Jaycees (e.g., the “microagressions” of “everyday sexism and racism”231), 
but such discrimination continues to hinder gender equality in the workplace 
and other spheres. 
Are single-sex or single-gender organizations an anachronism or do they 
have a significant role in furthering values protected by freedom of 
association?  Are such organizations particularly important to women and 
racial minorities when gender and race discrimination persists?  Might they 
advance, rather than hinder, freedom from discrimination?  I leave full 
discussion for another day, but note two recent developments that raise these 
questions.  First, in 2017, the Boy Scouts of America, an amicus for the 
Jaycees, announced that it would admit girls into its Cub Scout program and, 
by February 2019, into all ranks of scouting; its new name would be Scouts 
BSA.232  The leaders of the Girl Scouts cautioned against “reckless” thinking 
that the BSA could easily translate for girls a program “specifically tailored 
to boys” and appealed to research that girls learn scouting best in an all-
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female environment.233  Stressing problems of sexual abuse within the BSA, 
they questioned how it could “credibly claim” it could create a “safe space” 
for girls.234 
Sharp conflict over the value and place for single-gender organizations on 
college campuses is another example.  At Yale, female students have brought 
a class action alleging that Yale lags behind peers like Harvard in 
discouraging students from joining single-sex clubs and that Yale has turned 
a “blind eye” to the alcohol consumption, sexual harassment, and sexual 
assault connected with fraternities.235  Reminiscent of NOW’s argument in 
Jaycees, the plaintiffs also argue all-male fraternities exclude them from 
valuable social networks helpful for future employment and mentoring.236  
Meanwhile, at Harvard, where concern over campus sexual assault in all-
male clubs spurred policies directed at all students who join single-sex clubs, 
fraternities, and sororities, such groups have fought back, alleging sex 
discrimination and “associational discrimination.”237  The complaint also 
speaks of women’s loss, through Harvard’s policy, of the “tremendous value” 
of sorority membership as a source of resources, networks, knowledge, and 
connections and of women’s groups being “collateral damage” in the cause 
of purportedly protecting women from men.238  This complaint squarely 
raises the issue of whether such spaces continue to be necessary and 
empowering or are an anachronism in the twenty-first century.239 
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